Il presidente rumeno Iohannis ha declassificato i documenti presentati su Călin Georgescu. La SRI ha trovato 797 account creati nel 2016 per Georgescu-Roegen, conservati e “attivati ​​al massimo delle loro capacità” durante la campagna per le elezioni presidenziali

> The SRI reports also talk about money, with TikTok admitting that it collected $381,000 for Georgescu’s campaign.
>
> The SRI states that the network of accounts directly associated with Călin Georgescu’s campaign was initially made up of 25,000 accounts on TikTok that became very active two weeks before the first round. The promotion campaign was particularly well organized, the number of followers increased significantly.
>
> 797 of the accounts that initially formed the network were created in 2016. They had very low activity (1%) until November 11, 2024, when the entire network was activated at maximum capacity.
>
> The SRI also advances amounts of money, 1 million euros, that were mobilized, of which $381,000 were paid to TikTok by Romanian or South African citizens.
> SRI believes that a “state actor” was involved in Georgescu’s promotion
>
> SRI uses the idea twice that a state actor was involved in the Romanian elections. First, through certain attacks on AEP systems.
>
> Second, in the way in which Călin Georgescu’s notoriety was inflated and the promotion, messages and volume of TikTok accounts used were correlated.
> “A mode of operation designed to make identification activities more difficult
>
> SRI shows that no common technical resources were used and no shared IP addresses were observed. Specifically, the TikTok accounts in question were assigned to unique IP addresses, which denotes a mode of operation designed to make identification activities more difficult based on the use of a common infrastructure (a characteristic aspect of bot networks).
>
> The activity of the accounts in the network was organized outside the TikTok platform, namely on the Telegram messaging service. A propagating Telegram channel has been identified – “Get involved too, Romanian Renaissance Food Water Energy” – which has the role of coordinating other users regarding the posts and distributed video content.
>
> News in progress.

Links to the original documents:

* [Ministry of interior](https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Documente%20CSAT/Document%20CSAT%20MAI.pdf)
* [External Informaton Service](https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Documente%20CSAT/Document%20CSAT%20SIE.pdf)
* [Romanian Intelligence Service 1](https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Documente%20CSAT/Document%20CSAT%20SRI%20I.pdf)
* [Romanian Intelligence Service 2](https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Documente%20CSAT/Document%20CSAT%20SRI%20II.pdf)
* [Special Telecommunications Service](https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Documente%20CSAT/Document%20CSAT%20STS.pdf)

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edit: highly recommend reading the documents, especially the ones from the romanian intelligence service as the details are very interesting

Damn, 2016.

Interesting info about TikTok’s behaviour from Page 4 of the SRI 1 document.

> 1.5 TikTok’s conduct and relations with Romanian authorities
>
> On 20.11.2024, by decision no. 175D, the Central Electoral Bureau (BEC) ordered “the removal of electoral propaganda materials from the online environment depicting the candidate Călin Georgescu in the 2024 Romanian Presidential elections, which do not contain the identification code of the fiscal representative”. The request was sent to TikTok, through the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP), on 21.11.2024 (08:00).
>
> On 22.11.2024 (13:47), TikTok sent AEP confirmation of the removal of the posts that are the subject of BEC Decision no. 175D of 20.11.2024, by blocking visual access to them from the territory of Romania, they remaining visible in other states and able to be distributed.
>
> However, subsequent checks revealed that **TikTok did not delete the electoral content as requested by the AEP, and it continued to be available to the Romanian public, even after the end of the electoral campaign**, including on election day (aspects that contravene Romanian legislation).

Ok so since he declared 0 expenses this means fraud (ignoring the obvious treason implication).

We need the authorities to act and remove him from the elections and put him on trial. We can’t keep being complacent in front of Russia.

He must be punished, do you guys have Gulag in Romania, it should be the appropriate place for him.

For f@ck sake, what more does Europe need to take action against this russian propaganda directed specifically to destabilize the EU ?!

I live in Romania, and it was clear after he won the first tour of elections that most people that voted for him were brain washed with Tik Tok.

But our intelligence service also slept in their boots, this retard, Georgescu, should have been stopped before the first tour of elections.

Now:

* Let’s have a massive turnout at the polls, for EU
* Ban TikTok
* Increase defense spending
* Increase support for Ukraine
* Create an European Army

Remember all the British expats who were shocked when they couldn’t live in the EU anymore after Brexit?

In the future, I reckon historians will call 2016 the start of WW3.