Dall’articolo:
Il veterano si è lamentato in un’intervista che Syrskyi e la leadership esistente erano impegnati in “micro-gestione manuale dell’intero esercito” e ha messo in evidenza gli ordini dati ai soldati e alle unità costringendoli a riposare e basare troppo vicino al fronte."
(…)
"Uno dei soldati più noti dell’Ucraina, Krotevych, 32 anni, ha prestato servizio ad Azov dal 2014 e è sopravvissuto all’ultimo stand alle acciaierie Azovstal Nella primavera del 2022. Catturato dalle forze russe, subì un breve periodo di cattività prima di essere scambiato.
Krotevych ha quindi scelto di tornare davanti ed è diventato sempre più esplicito durante il suo ultimo periodo di servizio militare, criticando apertamente altri comandanti che credeva fosse stato negligente con la vita dei soldati.
Ma il veterano ha detto a The Guardian di aver “deciso il 70% di smettere” i militari ucraini perché i comandanti stavano ancora “chiedendo ai soldati cose che non avrebbero chiesto a se stessi”. Come ex prigioniero di guerra, è uno dei relativamente pochi soldati che hanno il diritto di andarsene.
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Krotevych ha dichiarato: “Syrskyi deve andare”, sostenendo che il comandante militare in capo, nominato nel febbraio 2024, non era riuscito a rompere le linee russe tranne in Kursk in agostodove aveva trovato “il punto più debole” e eseguito un semplice “sciopero lineare”.
Sebbene Krotevych ha detto che l’attacco in Russia aveva senso all’epoca, ha accusato Syrskyi di essere troppo concentrato sull’attacco “quando abbiamo avuto enormi problemi” difendere Pokrovsk nel sud di Donbas e “rimanendo lì troppo a lungo” poiché Mosca ha gradualmente arrotolato il saliente, con le forze ucraine che subiscono perdite significative.
L’Ucraina non era riuscita a trovare un modo per perseguire la guerra di manovra mentre “il nemico riesce in qualche modo a sfondare le nostre linee ogni mese”, si è lamentato Krotevych.
“Syrskyi non sta cercando di applicare un’alta scienza e un’arte della guerra”, ha detto Krotevych, accusandolo di avere “solo due funzioni: se il nemico sta attaccando, lanci più persone lì dentro. E se il nemico è schiacciante, ritira la gente e dici che ti preoccupi delle vite della gente”.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/09/ukraine-military-chief-oleksandr-syrskyi-must-go-bohdan-krotevych
di AbnormalNormie
7 commenti
I think that these things need to be kept far from the Press, because it fuels only the enemy. But who am I?
So…….anyone actually good enough to lead the military in UKR?
It feels like they don’t have any good candidates.
Common guys, don’t tell me UKR can’t even find ONE good general?
This is pretty devastating to read, because it shows the desperation of Krotevych. Nobody in the UA army or government probably wanted to listen to what he has to say, so he approached the western media. Hopefully it will serve its purpose in some kind of positive changes and not the other way around.
Easy to criticize when you’re not in charge.
Krotevych must accept that Syrskyi probably knows things that he don’t.
I like Syrskyi, and despite being a huge fan of Zaluzhnyi, it was time for a change.
I am reserving judgement because I want to understand the part that Krotevych didn’t say, which is the western-style command structure.
Meaning, in the Soviet army, from which the UA had history, everything was autocratic: one leader, everyone listens, you do it and that’s it.
Western armies, people at the platoon or even squad level can call off/change a mission.
The UA had been implementing this.
So when he goes public like this, I see it one of two ways:
1. It’s a cry for help because they aren’t behaving like a western military
2. He isn’t telling the whole story, because Syrskyi understands this command structure and promotes it
And we really don’t know. Maybe it’s #2 because he prefers Zaluzhnyi and wants him back. Maybe it’s #1 and Syrskyi is making a mistake.
He’s a brave fighter and the one thing I know about the Azov boys is that they were NOT the ones standing down per orders. If anything, this has always been a very independent, local group who were really never a part of the UA, but aligned with them.
So maybe he doesn’t like being under the UA.
This should be an interesting development, but the moral of the story should be that commanders on the ground have nothing stopping them from countermanding an order and moving their guys farther back to rest.
I happen to have watched an interview with Krotevych a few days ago, and it may be the one referred to here. There’s no question in my mind that he is completely right in his assessment. Everything he suggested is based on serving in combat, particularly at Mariupul, and there is no higher cred than that. Also the successful US model.
Sirsky is the old school, Soviet-minded mentality of incompetence and brute force, the same approach that has cost Russia so heavily. Personally I’ve never trusted him because of his close family ties to Russia.
It will take completely new leaders from the lower ranks, that have combat experience, being promoted into much higher leadership to make the necessary changes. This is how UA will finally break away from Russia.
Let us hope that the Ukrainian General Staff is open to any form of criticism and is also constantly learning, as everyone must learn very fast in this war.