Ciao a tutti. Stavo guardando l’interessante discussione tra i due negoziatori di Cy Problem Andreas Mavrogiannis e Ozdil Nami YouTube
Al momento 39:02 Fidias chiede a Mavrogiannis perché era contro il piano Annan e Mavrogiannis afferma che uno dei motivi era
Un collegamento molto elevato che è stato stabilito nel piano Annan tra l’attuazione dell’accordo e l’adesione della Turchia all’UE. E su questo, la storia ha dimostrato che avevo ragione. Ora siamo 21 anni dopo e non c’è adesione alla Turchia all’UE.
Mi chiedevo da dove provenga questa stazione e se fosse corretta. Per quanto posso vedere in Altro piano, "Cipro sostiene l’adesione della Turchia all’Unione." Ok, qualunque cosa. Anche se Cipro lo supporta, ci sono altri paesi che non lo faranno. Ci sono diversi riferimenti nel piano in merito all’implementazione, ma afferma che se la Turchia non è ammessa nell’UE entro 19 anni, i vincoli non hanno alcun effetto. L’unica menzione che ho potuto scoprire che non scade dopo 19 anni è su questioni militari:
Cipro non deve mettere il suo territorio a disposizione di operazioni militari internazionali se non con il consenso di entrambi gli stati costituenti; Fino a quando è necessario l’adesione della Turchia all’Unione Europea, è richiesto anche il consenso della Grecia e della Turchia.
Non sembra come "Un collegamento molto alto". Qualcuno può chiarire cosa significasse Mavrogiannis con la sua dichiarazione?
Regarding Andreas Mavrogiannis' statement on the Annan plan
byu/eev200 incyprus
di eev200
2 commenti
First of all, he makes it clear that his problem was the issue of guarantees and security, which is still the elephant in the room.
What he may be trying to say, I think, has to do with the major issue of the illegal settlers that Turkey has transferred to the northern part occupied by the Turkish army, of the Republic of Cyprus and how they will not be deported after a solution to the problem is reached. Their number is large and, to this day, Turkey is negotiating their status in a possible federal solution. If Turkey were to join the European Union, they would have the right to remain as European citizens because of the four freedoms of the European Union, which are the free movement of capital, establishment, and the provision of services and goods. Turkey is currently demanding all of this from the European Union to a certain extent, particularly free movement for its citizens. The position of the Greek Cypriot side is that the settlers must leave even the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, with exceptions, and they will certainly not acquire Cypriot citizenship. This also applies to Turkish businesspeople operating in the occupied part of the island, most of whom are associates of the AKP and the government, with all the illegalities that may arise from these transactions.
However, this is very minor compared to the issue of the presence of the Turkish army on the island within a federal solution and the right of guaranteeing intervention.
You can see today where Turkey stands in terms of its accession process, the reforms it needs to make internally, human rights and freedom of expression, and many other things that, if I were to mention them all, I would end up writing a book to include them all. Mr. Mavrogiannis was indeed right.
Of course I can’t be inside Mavrogiannis’ head to answer exactly what he had in mind, but given he is a respectable diplomat who knows what he’s talking about, this is my interpretation of it when I first heard it and how I processed it over time.
Certain aspects of the Annan plan concerning Turkey’s binding agreements (withdrawal of troops, territorial concessions, repatriation/reimbursement of GC refugees etc) were meant to be implemented incrementally over steps, spanning several years. Even if GCs accepted that this is a decent deal while themselves having to make concessions immediately, what dominated the political climate was suspicion that Turkey will not abide by it, at least not strictly.
The idea of some pro-Annan politicians was that – given the plan and the resolution of the Cyprus problem was primarily pushed as a way for Turkey to advance its EU accession process – Turkey’s commitment would be motivated by self-interest to join the EU timely. So GCs’ only reasonable safeguards to their very reasonable fears was that Turkey would soon be a fellow EU member, therefore there would be incentives to engage in good will.
As history proves though, Turkey took a sharp anti-EU turn over time, within the time span where it would have been crucial for Turkey to fulfill their obligations towards the newly unified Cypriot state. While it can be argued this was aided by the failure of Annan and Cyprus’ admission to the EU anyway, it is obvious that Erdoğan is an ideologically inconsistent leader that shifted politically to adjust to Turkey’s political climate and establish his rule. So it is still valid to be skeptical about whether Turkey was ever going to act in good will over Cyprus, meaning Turkey’s veneer of political gravitation towards the EU was indeed not a saving grace for the Annan plan.
An ideal solution to the Cyprus problem is then implied to be one where Turkey is politically and militarily completely removed immediately, not allowing “me ne frego” politics to undermine peace and fairness in Cyprus. We cannot possibly rely on goodwill ostensibly gained from Turkey promising a European future; the solution should be fair on day 1 and not giving Turkey any leeway.