Lettera aperta: centinaia di scienziati si oppongono al controllo della chat

Text: Hundreds of scientists oppose chat control

Renowned researchers remind members of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union that chat control would offer ‘unprecedented opportunities for surveillance, control and censorship’. They call for the causes of sexualised violence against children to be tackled instead of monitoring hundreds of millions of people.More than 470 scientists from 34 countries oppose the current proposal for chat control, which the Danish Presidency presented to the EU Council on 24 July.For several years, the EU Commission has been trying to implement a project that would scrutinise encrypted communications in the EU, for example on messengers such as Signal. In this way, it wants to search for depictions of sexualised violence against children (CSAM).The EU member states have so far been unable to agree on a common position on the controversial project. A majority supports the EU Commission’s plans, but a blocking minority of states is blocking them and advocating the Parliament’s surveillance-critical position. Several presidencies have so far failed to organise an agreement in the Council, most recently Poland. Germany’s position could be decisive for the progress of the negotiations because, as a populous country, Germany alone can overturn the existing blocking minority. In their letter, the signatories welcome the inclusion of provisions that facilitate the voluntary reporting of illegal activities and the call to speed up the processing of such reports. However, they are strongly opposed to the searching of end devices and age checks on the internet. ‘Unprecedented opportunities for surveillance, control and censorship’

It is simply not possible to detect known and new images of sexualised violence (CSAM) for hundreds of millions of users with acceptable accuracy, regardless of the specific filter. Furthermore, device-based detection, regardless of its technical implementation, undermines the protection that end-to-end encryption is designed to provide. The changes in the proposal would also increase dependence on technical means, thereby exacerbating security and privacy risks for citizens without guaranteeing improved protection for children. The open letter, available in German and English, states: The new proposal, like its predecessors, would create unprecedented opportunities for surveillance, control and censorship and carries an inherent risk of abuse by less democratic regimes. The level of security and privacy achieved today in digital communications and IT systems is the result of decades of joint efforts by research, industry and politics. There is no doubt that this proposal completely undermines these security and privacy measures, which are essential for the protection of the digital society.The letter also points out contradictions in the new proposal: it states that CSAM detection technology should not lead to a ‘weakening of the protection offered by encryption’.However, it is impossible to detect material and submit corresponding reports without undermining encryption. One of the key design principles of secure end-to-end encryption (E2EE) protection is to ensure that, firstly, only the two intended endpoints can access the data and, secondly, that a single point of failure is avoided. Mandatory detection and encryption are mutually exclusive However, if a detection mechanism scans the data before it is encrypted, as envisaged in the current Danish proposal, with the possibility of transmitting it to law enforcement authorities after verification, this violates both principles: it undermines the core feature of E2EE by accessing private data via the detection mechanism, and at the same time creates a single point of failure for all secure E2EE systems through forced detection. However, end-to-end encryption is essential for EU citizens to communicate securely and privately online, especially considering that core parts of our communications infrastructure are controlled by US big tech companies. Encryption protects not only civil society, but also EU politicians, decision-makers, law enforcement agencies and defence forces. They rely heavily on encryption to ensure secure communication against internal and external threats.
More education needed to combat abuse
The researchers also reject the narrative that CSAM images can only be combated with technical means:We would like to remind everyone that CSAM content is always the result of child sexual abuse. Eliminating it therefore requires combating the abuse itself, not just preventing the digital distribution of abuse material.Politicians should therefore stop relying on technologies of dubious effectiveness, such as CSAM detection algorithms and age verification, which significantly weaken security and privacy. Instead, they should follow the measures recommended by the United Nations. These include education about consent, norms and values, digital literacy and online safety, comprehensive sex education, and hotlines for reporting abuse.

If they wanted to stop violence against kids they would call out Vatican till they are ready to answer questions.

# Take Action! Contact Your MEPs

Your privacy and freedoms are at risk. These policies will impact every European—your messages, photos, and private conversations will be scanned without your consent. But we have the power to stop this. Contact your MEPs now with a clear message: NO to mass surveillance. Your voice matters. Make it heard today.

[https://fightchatcontrol.eu/#contact-tool](https://fightchatcontrol.eu/#contact-tool)

Hundreds of French cats oppose chat control

Is it possible to flood chat control with false positives? Could we organise a campaign to do something like that?

[fightchatcontrol.eu](http://fightchatcontrol.eu)

Take action to fight this shit