L’UE vuole porre fine all’era dei veti nazionali, ma è complicato

Brussels has put forward numerous veto-proof legislative proposals to overcome repeated opposition from Hungary and Slovakia. Experts say the strategy is politically and legally risky. But has it become inevitable?

At a crunch summit earlier this month, European leaders turned to a tool that would have seemed unthinkable just a few months earlier to break an impasse: issuing joint debt backed by the common budget to keep Ukraine afloat as the war rages on.

The trick? It bypassed the need for unanimity among member states, gathering those who wanted to work together while keeping Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic out of the deal as a condition for it to go forward. In doing so, the EU not only managed to secure €90 billion for Ukraine for 2026 and 2027 as it had promised, but also showed a new path forward – one where where the unanimity requirement need no longer obstruct coalitions of the willing.

That is nothing short of extraordinary for a union often constrained by unanimous decision-making. It also builds a theme that is gaining momentum in Brussels: finding alternatives to bypass national vetoes, in particular when exercised by Hungary, which has made its right to veto the centrepiece of its Brussels policy when it comes to Ukraine – from its financing to Kyiv’s candidacy to join the EU.

To issue joint debt at 24, bypassing Budapest, Prague and Bratislava, the EU cited the principle of “enhanced cooperation” as foreseen in its treaties. It is just the latest legal tweak that Brussels has turned to in order to break a deadlock.

Most recently, it also employed Article 122 of the treaties, approved through qualified majority, to keep the Russian frozen assets held in Europe locked indefinitely in the EU. Until then, the assets had been held under a standard sanction regime, which operated on unanimity and therefore depended on securing a yes from Hungary and Slovakia.

While Article 122 is framed in the treaties as a means by which to address severe economic crises, the plan to use it to unlock funding for Ukraine was clearly a way to bypass recalcitrant member states. It’s another example of a strategy the bloc is increasingly using to circumvent vetoes on issues where a near-consensus exists, an approach that is starting to yield results – but not without risks.

“We see straightforward commitment from the part of EU leadership to try to circumvent potential vetoes coming from Hungary and Slovakia and put important decisions on the footing of qualified majority voting,” Dániel Hegedűs, a regional director of the German Marshall Fund, told Euronews.

“On the other hand, I don’t think that this is bulletproof. Neither legally nor politically.”

If someone like orban uses his sovereignty to veto something, the other nations can use the same argument to do things together.

That’s perfect 🤩

Yes, let’s abolish the veto and hand decision making over solely to Germany, that will be best for everyone. Fur Deutschland!

It’s complicated because a lot of countries are blocking it (as they block multiple other much needed reforms to transform the EU to something closer to a federation) because narrow minded politicians want to preserve their own power.

In this case, the Nordics have a “we do stuff better than the EU so we cannot accept not being able to veto EU stuff we don’t like” mentality which is the main roadblock.

Similar reasons why we don’t have a Banking Union, a Fiscal Union and a complete Single Market yet: national governments are unwilling to cede power…

I think this is terrible. Either the EU is a democratic country, that is accountable to its voters, or they shouldn’t be able to overrule national governments at all. Else they create institutional moral hazards and distortions that lead to legitimacy problems. Already I think it’s a big problem, that national governments can shift accountability to the EU, if they can’t or don’t want to satisfy their voting population.

Edit: Be aware, that no matter on which side you are ideologically, every system you design can go both ways. I don’t think you really want a system, where a centralized institution with relatively low democratic accountability can overrule national governments in the long run. You might be celebrating for one thing, but think about what can happen in 10 years.

This will definitely not backfire in the future. /s

You can create another EU inside the existing EU. This Super EU will do everything the regular EU does but without the veto, and when it works, you can simply close down the Original EU, while everyone who is against the lack of a veto will be left behind.

Another step towards the EU’s demise. Good riddance!

For those interested about which countries vetoed more often:

https://michalovadek.github.io/eu-veto-tracker/

QMV is the only solution if the EU wants to move forward

Its unfortunate that it came to this point. What makes the EU so unique is that you NEED dialogue and compromise to get things done/into law etc.

But when we let in countries to the institution that are clearly have bad intentions or negotiate on bad faith that is where the current system is flawed and shows cracks.

However to not be overtly negative here… its not stopping countries from making coalitions and work together to still get deals done, by simply forming a coalition with countries that do agree. Only thing you can’t do here is make it officially into a law that all EU countries must abide by, because that can only be done if all countries agree.

you see this type of framework more now, where its basically all countries minus a few and then they can sill come to an agreement.

Either way, I hope there comes a point when we can kick out countries from the EU if a majority agreement (80%) can be reached.

We should maintain the veto for things i like, for things i dont like i think we should get rid of it

There must be a veto, otherwise small states will get drowned out and the only sensible thi g forthem will be to make their own union (see Visegrad type of deal).

I wouldhowever make veto use more costly – e.g. if Veto is invoked, non-veto states can finance a vote in veto states with the bar to uphold veto being set to 2/3 in favor with minimum 20% votes or something like that.

So if vetoed resolution is exsistental, surely the vetoing population will support the veto. If not, then veto fails and is overturned. If rogue government wishes to campaign for veto, they can but the majority has more finances ready to counter it.

So, let veto be used. But also let the vetoer paythe political costs.